Alessio Tesi, Daniela Di Santo, Antonio Aiello
Department of Political Science, University of Pisa, Italy
Across many contemporary democracies, a paradox is becoming increasingly visible: citizens may freely choose leaders who later weaken the democratic systems that enabled their rise. They sometimes support leaders who later concentrate power, weaken institutional checks and balances, attack intermediary bodies, and gradually narrow the space for dissent. This does not usually happen through dramatic ruptures, but rather through incremental and often justified changes, framed in terms of necessity, security, or national recovery. In this sense, democracy is not only vulnerable to external threats, but can also be eroded from within, through decisions that remain formally legitimate and socially acceptable.
This internal erosion represents one of the most relevant political challenges of our time. It suggests that democratic institutions alone are not sufficient to guarantee democratic resilience. Their functioning depends on how citizens perceive uncertainty, define belonging, respond to perceived threats, and interpret political communication. A democracy may therefore remain formally intact, while becoming progressively less pluralistic, less reflective, and more inclined to concentrate power in leaders who promise rapid and decisive solutions.
A psychosocial perspective is particularly useful for understanding this process. People do not relate to politics only through abstract principles, but through identity, emotions, and everyday experiences of vulnerability. When uncertainty becomes widespread and persistent, democratic deliberation may start to feel slow and ineffective, while more assertive and simplified forms of leadership may appear reassuring. This is where the paradox becomes evident: citizens who value democracy may nonetheless be attracted to leaders who adopt a more coercive, aggressive, and populist style.
Understanding this attraction is essential. If democratic systems are to be preserved, it is necessary to understand why strong leadership may appear effective, institutional constraints may be perceived as obstacles, and inequality or exclusion may become acceptable. Only then is it possible to reflect on concrete interventions.
The democratic paradox: how erosion happens from the inside
Public debate often imagines authoritarian danger in spectacular terms: coups d’état, military juntas, the suspension of constitutions, the direct abolition of elections. Such events certainly occur, but they are not the only way democracies weaken. Contemporary democratic erosion often follows a subtler path. Institutions formally remain in place, elections still occur, and political actors continue to speak in the name of the people. Yet the spirit of democratic life changes, and the result is that power becomes more personalized, criticism is delegitimized, institutions become dependent on loyalty, and opposition is easily cast as sabotage or betrayal.
What makes this process especially troubling is that each step can appear reasonable. Examples include a government calling for greater executive discretion because there is an emergency; courts that are criticized because they allegedly obstruct the popular will; journalists who are attacked because they are said to spread panic, lies, or elitist contempt; civil society actors that are portrayed as detached from the real people; minority protections that are described as privileges; and institutional limits that are presented not as safeguards, but as technical annoyances that prevent swift action. In other words, democratic erosion works by changing the meaning of democratic norms before it openly attacks them.
From a psychosocial perspective, this is crucial. It is hard to believe that many people explicitly choose authoritarianism. Much more often, they adapt to new interpretations of necessity. When fear runs high, uncertainty becomes chronic, and politics seems ineffective, a more centralized and aggressive style may appear practical rather than undemocratic. The question may move from “Is this compatible with democratic pluralism?” to “Does this person seem capable of acting?” This shift from normative to instrumental evaluation is one psychological gateway for internal erosion across societies (Jost, 2019).
The paradox, then, lies not simply in the fact that democracies can fail, but in the fact that they can fail precisely through appeals that resonate with the democratic public. Leaders who concentrate power often present themselves as responding to the people’s frustrations with a political system that appears too slow, fragmented, or constrained by rules and procedures. In this sense, democratic erosion is often parasitic on democratic language itself. It claims to rescue democracy from its own institutional complexity by personalizing power in the name of efficiency and immediacy.
This dynamic is particularly dangerous because it does not require the disappearance of popular support; on the contrary, it can thrive on popular endorsement. Citizens may accept, justify, or demand a stronger hand when they feel that the usual channels of representation are unable to address urgent threats. The erosion of democracy from within, therefore, depends on a social psychology of vulnerability, threat, and persuasion, not only on the ambitions of political elites.
Identity, belonging, and why political leadership is never just about competence
One reason why strong leaders can become so persuasive lies in the role of social identity. People do not encounter politics only as private individuals weighing options in a detached manner. They encounter it as members of groups, as nationals, workers, residents, communities, generations, and cultural publics. These memberships are not merely descriptive but carry emotional and symbolic meaning. Political leaders who can activate these dimensions often gain influence not simply because they appear competent, but because they seem to embody “who we are” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
Social identity approaches in social psychology have shown for decades that group membership shapes perception, evaluation, and action. People seek a positive and coherent sense of belonging (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). They are attentive to those who define the group’s values, identify threats to the group, and promise to restore dignity or control. Effective leadership, in this view, is not merely managerial; it is representative and symbolic. Leaders succeed when they are seen as prototypical of the group, as reflecting its norms, concerns, and emotional tone (Steffens et al., 2014).
This matters enormously in times of uncertainty. When social life feels unstable, identity becomes a key source of orientation. In this sense, a leader who offers a clear definition of the group and a clear assessment of the danger can become highly persuasive.
Populist and demagogic leadership works well here because it simplifies politics into a moral story: “the people” are good and betrayed, elites are corrupt, and outgroups are threats or incompatible with the moral community. The leader presents themselves as the only ones willing to speak the truth, recasting aggression as courage, coarseness as authenticity, and polarization as conviction. This is one reason why aggressive leaders can attract support even among citizens who would normally reject aggressiveness or incivility. Their style conveys confidence and unity, seemingly less concerned with pursuing interests and more focused on defending the group. In periods of diffuse threat, this can be deeply appealing. People may feel that only someone willing to confront enemies, silence obstruction, and act decisively can truly protect them.
This identity-based leadership model easily leads to exclusion and anti-pluralism. If the leader is seen as the true voice of the people, critics become enemies, dissent becomes suspect, and defining belonging against threatening others undermines democratic coexistence. Identity can foster solidarity, but in times of fear, it can also legitimize coercive authority (Reicher et al., 2018).
Threat, uncertainty, and the search for certainty
Threat and uncertainty play a central role in this dynamic. Economic insecurity, climate anxiety, and social change all contribute to a sense of instability. When individuals feel that their environment is unpredictable, they tend to prefer clear rules, strong authority, and simplified explanations (Hogg, 2007; Kruglanski, 2013). In this context, strong leaders may appear particularly attractive. They promise rapid solutions, identify clear causes, and present themselves as capable of acting decisively. Even when these solutions are not realistic, they can provide psychological reassurance. Similar dynamics can be observed across different domains. In economic crises, leaders who promise to restore control may gain support. In the context of climate change, some may support centralized authority as a way to impose necessary measures, while others may support nationalist solutions to avoid costs. In both cases, the appeal of strong leadership increases because threats are perceived as urgent and existential. Democratic norms are not necessarily rejected, but temporarily suspended or reinterpreted. Citizens may accept stronger authority as a necessary response to crises, believing that such measures are temporary. However, over time, these changes may become normalized.
Why do coercive, populist, and demagogic leaders feel effective?
The effectiveness of coercive and populist leaders is often more perceived than real, but it is nonetheless powerful. They create an impression of decisiveness, especially in contexts where institutions appear slow. They also personalize solutions, making complex issues more emotionally accessible. Another important mechanism is the transformation of anxiety into anger. Anxiety is diffuse and difficult to manage, while anger is directed and mobilizing. By identifying clear enemies or obstacles, leaders provide a sense of orientation (Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018). At the same time, they reframe institutional constraints as illegitimate barriers, which further increases their appeal. Democratic procedures may come to be seen as obstacles rather than safeguards. This combination of clarity, action, and emotional direction makes such leadership particularly persuasive, even if it does not produce effective solutions.
Legitimizing the system, accepting hierarchy, normalizing inequality
Another process helps explain why citizens can accommodate these shifts: the tendency to justify existing arrangements, or to reinterpret them as legitimate under pressure. Social psychology has long noted that people are often motivated not only by personal interest or group interest, but also by a desire to see the system in which they live as fair, stable, and meaningful. This motivation can become stronger when uncertainty is high, because believing that the social world has order can reduce distress (Jost, 2019).
Under such conditions, even arrangements that are unequal, coercive, or exclusionary may come to be perceived as necessary or inevitable. Hierarchies may be reframed as functionally justified, strong command as effective coordination, and unequal burdens as regrettable yet unavoidable. Citizens may rationalize the curtailment of certain freedoms, the disciplining of particular groups, and the circumvention of institutional procedures on the grounds that the circumstances are exceptional.
This is also where preferences for hierarchy and social dominance may become more acceptable in public culture. Not everyone explicitly desires inequality, but many can come to accept hierarchical arrangements when they are framed as protective, efficient, or natural responses to crisis. In times of uncertainty, people often want someone to be in charge. Under these conditions, hierarchy can cease to appear as domination and instead come to be experienced as a source of reassurance and stability (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).
The normalization of this view can be gradual. Citizens may first support stronger police powers, then tolerate weaker judicial independence, then accept harsher rhetoric against opponents, then become indifferent to attacks on minorities. Yet the cumulative effect is a democratic culture increasingly comfortable with coercion and decreasingly attached to mutual restraint.
Communication dynamics
Communication plays an important role in reinforcing these processes. Political messages that are simple, emotionally engaging, and repeated tend to be more persuasive, especially when individuals are already experiencing uncertainty. Citizens rarely process political messages through slow analytical reasoning, relying instead on cues, impressions, and emotional shortcuts.
Assertiveness can therefore become a cue for competence. Repetition can become a cue for truth. Moral certainty can become a cue for leadership. In highly polarized environments, the outrage a leader provokes can even strengthen support among followers, because controversy is interpreted as proof that the leader is challenging entrenched powers. Political beliefs are filtered through partisan and group-based identities, which makes emotionally vivid, simplified narratives especially powerful in polarized contexts (Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018).
However, it is important to avoid an overly deterministic view of communication. Citizens are not passive recipients, and communication interacts with identity, experience, and social context. What matters is not only the message itself, but the conditions under which it is received. Rather than focusing only on digital media or “fast cognition”, it may be more useful to consider how communication environments shape opportunities for reflection. When individuals lack spaces for discussion and comparison, they may rely more on simplified interpretations.
Practical implications
Educators can help students understand how threat and uncertainty shape judgment. This does not mean moralizing about “bad choices.” It means making visible a basic psychosocial fact: when people feel afraid or disoriented, they become more susceptible to messages that promise immediate clarity and strong protection. This can make them more aware of the appeal of authoritarian shortcuts without shaming them for being vulnerable to that appeal (Hogg, 2007; Jost, 2019). A second task is to teach students how political communication works emotionally, not only informationally. Many young people are surrounded by rapid, emotionally saturated media environments. If they are not helped to slow down and interpret these environments, they are left alone with persuasive forms specifically designed to bypass reflection. Further, schools and universities can either reproduce rigid boundaries or cultivate more inclusive forms of belonging. This matters because narrow and threatened identities are fertile ground for demagogic politics. Educational spaces can instead emphasize layered identities, shared interdependence, and the capacity to disagree without expulsion from the moral community. This is not a naive celebration of harmony, but a democratic skill (Reicher et al., 2018; Steffens et al., 2014).
For unions and workers’ organizations, the issue is equally salient. Where work becomes precarious, social protections weaken, and collective bargaining loses efficacy, citizens are more likely to experience politics through the lenses of anxiety and resentment. In such a context, demagogic leaders may present themselves as defenders of “ordinary people,” often while undermining the very collective institutions that could actually increase workers’ power. Unions require strategies that clearly articulate insecurity without reproducing the politics of permanent fear. They should frame economic hardship in ways that encourage collective action rather than scapegoating; resist framing that equates crisis with deference to strong authority; and foster solidarity across sectors, generations, and national backgrounds, because fragmented workers are more easily mobilized through exclusionary populism. Unions can also serve as spaces of democratic learning. In workplaces where people discuss, deliberate, negotiate, and organize, democratic competence is not an abstraction; it is practiced.
Democratic resilience is grounded in the quality of communities’ everyday social relations, in local opportunities for participation, in the presence or absence of collective efficacy, and in the extent to which individuals experience themselves as agents rather than as passive observers. Community actors are thus positioned to intervene at multiple levels. They can cultivate reflective spaces in which citizens deliberate on public issues without immediate polarization; promote local initiatives that enhance shared efficacy and participation; facilitate bridging between groups otherwise separated by fear-based narratives; and mitigate the forms of social isolation upon which demagogic politics frequently rely. In this regard, research on deliberative processes is particularly instructive. It indicates that well-designed deliberative settings can reduce affective polarization, foster more reflective judgment, and reinforce the perception that disagreement can be managed without mutual dehumanization (Fishkin et al., 2021; Luskin et al., 2022). This insight is especially pertinent for actors seeking to reconstruct democratic capacities at the local level.
Conclusion
Democracy will always be slower than command, more conflictual than obedience, and more complex than propaganda. Its strength lies precisely there. If contemporary democracies are under pressure, it is not only because authoritarian actors have become more skilled. It is also because the social conditions that make citizens receptive to authoritarian appeals have become widespread. To defend democracy today, then, means more than defending elections or constitutions, though both remain essential. It requires a systematic understanding of the conditions under which democratic systems may be willingly undermined from within, as well as a recognition of the appeal of strong, coercive leadership in contexts of perceived existential threat. It further necessitates the development of forms of education, organization, communication, and community life capable of providing what demagogic politics promises but cannot substantively deliver: protection without exclusion, efficacy without domination, and collective direction without the erosion of pluralism. The challenge, then, is not only to defend democratic institutions, but to ensure that citizens experience democracy itself as a credible source of protection, meaning, and collective agency.
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